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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-MINORS AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: DECISION
AND AVOIDANCE
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the 1,058 inmates on the nation's death rows,' seventeen 2 had a
special interest in Eddings v. Oklahoma,3 a capital punishment case de-
cided by the Supreme Court last term. 4 All seventeen were under the
age of eighteen when they committed their crimes,5 and all seventeen
had been transferred from the protective custody of the juvenile court
system 6 to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, where they were tried
as adults. 7 In Eddings, one of their number, Monty Lee Eddings, urged
I Newsletter by Legal Defense and Education Fund, (August 20, 1982) (discussing death
row).
2 Brief for Appellant at 19a, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
3 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
4 The Supreme Court decided three other capital punishment cases last term. See En-
mund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); Hopper v. Evans, 102 S. Ct. 2049 (1982); Zant v.
Stephens, 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982).
5 See Brief for Appellant at 19a, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
6 The juvenile court system is the product of an early nineteenth century movement
which advocated that juvenile offenders be treated differently from adults, and that these
youths be rehabilitated rather than punished. See generall R. PICKET, HOUSE OF REFUGE
(1967); A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977);
Fox juvenileJustice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Schultz, The
Cycle ofjuvenile Court History, 19 CRIM. & DELINQ. 457 (1973). Today every state has a juve-
nile court system and juvenile correctional facilities. The penalties administered by the juve-
nile courts are far less severe than those administered by the criminal system, and these courts
cannot require that a juvenile be institutionalized beyond the age of majority. See S. DAVIS,
RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980) (citing and summariz-
ing current juvenile statutes of each state); M. LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
A STUDY OF JUVENILE CODES IN THE UNITED STATES (1974). See generally Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversay System: Problems ofFunction and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 7; Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909); Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing
Perspective on the Legal Rights ofJuvenile Delinquents, 18 GRIM. & DELINQ. 68 (1972); Note,Juve-
nile Delinquents,- The Police, State Courts, and IndividualizedJustice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
7 In most states, juveniles charged with a criminal offense can, under certain circum-
stances, be transferred to adult criminal courts through the process of waiver. See Feld, Legis-
lative Policies toward the Serious Juvenile Offender, 27 GRIM. & DELINQ. 497, 500-11 (1981);
Schornhorst, The Waiver ofJuvenile Court Jurisdictiovn Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 595-98
(1968). There are two types of waiver. The most common method is judicial waiver, whereby
the juvenile courts are empowered to divest themselves of jurisdiction in certain cases. Judi-
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the Court to adopt a blanket prohibition against the imposition of death
sentences on juvenile offenders.8 Such punishment, he contended, is
cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. 9
Although the Court had granted certiorari in Eddings solely to con-
sider the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on juvenile de-
fendants,10 the Court failed to address this unresolvedI and increasingly
contested 12 issue in its opinion. Instead, the Court's decision focused on
cial waiver is sometimes permitted only with respect to felonies. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 11-1553 (West 1966). But in many states judicial waiver is permitted when a minor is
charged with any criminal offense. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45 (West 1981). Some
states only permit judicial waiver when the juvenile is above a certain age. Set, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 12-15-34(a) (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45(1 1) (West 1981) (must be fourteen or
older). Others permit judicial waiver at any age. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1112(b) (West 1980).
The other type of waiver is legislative waiver, whereby the statute provides that the
juvenile courts will not have jurisdiction over juveniles accused of capital or other serious
crimes. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1(d) (Bums 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1570(A)(5) (West 1982).
The transfer process is said to serve three purposes: (1) protect the public from those
juveniles who are incapable of being rehabilitated by the juvenile system; (2) ease the burden
on the juvenile justice system; and (3) deter juveniles from committing serious crimes. See
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); Comment, A Modelfor the Transfer of
Juvenile Felony Ofenders to Adult Court Jurisdiction, 4 J. JUv. L. 170, 179 (1980). See Generally D.
BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE COURT 249-64 (1974);
Browne, Guidelinesfor Statutesfor Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
479 (1977); Comment,Juveniles in the Criminal Courts.- A Substantive View of the Fitness Decision,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 988 (1976); Note, Waiver ofjuvenile Court Jurisdiction Under Iowa's New
Juvenile Justice Act, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 405 (1979-1980); Note, Juvenile Crime: The Misguided
Target of the Current Solution, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 97 (1982).
8 Brief for Appellant at 18-59, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
9 Id. See in/ra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
10 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). Review of all other questions raised in the
petition of certiorari was denied. The other questions raised in the petition were:
[1] Whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had construed or applied 21
Okla. Stat. § 701.12(4) [the section of Oklahoma's death penalty statute listing the fact
that a "murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" as an aggravating circum-
stance] in an impermissibly vague fashion in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
[2] Whether a state is obligated by the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide funds to all indigent capital defendants
for necessary expert or investigative assistance when the state has chosen by statute to
provide assistance to those defendants in counties with a population exceeding 200,000
persons?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
11 See Brief for Appellant at 18, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). Although
the Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, all of its
decisions have involved adult defendants. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12 Tod Ice, a seventeen year old youth who was convicted and sentenced to death for a
murder allegedly committed when he was fifteen years old, is presently challenging the consti-
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a very different issue: one which was brought to its attention for the first
time in the petitioner's brief. '3
As an alternative ground for relief, Eddings argued that his sen-
tence was unconstitutional because the sentencing judge had refused to
consider his troubled childhood and lack of emotional and mental ma-
turity as mitigating factors.' 4 Finding that the lower courts had refused
to consider these circumstances in mitigation, and that such refusal was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reversed Eddings' sentence and re-
manded the case for resentencing.' 5 Since it was able to resolve the case
on the basis of well-established principles, the Court chose not to con-
sider the highly controversial issue on which it had granted certiorari.'
6
As this note will demonstrate, the Eddings decision adds little to the
Court's prior opinions in the area of mitigating circumstances.17 It has
long been the view of the Court that a state may not, by statute, pre-
clude a sentencer from considering any relevant circumstances offered
by a defendant in mitigation of the death penalty.' 8 Moreover, the
Court has previously provided guidelines by which to determine
whether a particular circumstance is relevant.' 9 In Eddings, the Court
merely applied established rules and guidelines to the facts before it,
holding that the sentencer may not refuse to consider any relevant miti-
gating circumstance, and that a youthful defendant's troubled child-
hood and mental and emotional difficulties are indeed relevant. 20
Eddings may, therefore, prove to be of greater interest because it
tutionality of imposing the death sentence on minors in the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Ice
v. Kentucky, No. 81-SC-5-I (Ky. filed Jan. 6, 1981). Several national and state organizations
have also maintained that it is unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to death. In Eddings, for
example, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the Kentucky Youth Advo-
cates and the Kentucky Office for Public Advocacy submitted amici curiae briefs in which they
contended that such punishment was cruel and unusual. See Amici Curiae Brief of National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and
American Orthopsychiatric Association, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 [hereinafter
cited as Brief of National Council on Crime and Delinquency]; Amici Curiae Brief of Ken-
tucky Youth Advocates and the Kentucky Office for Public Advocacy, Eddings v. Oklahoma,
102 S. Ct. 869 [hereinafter cited as Brief of Kentucky Youth Advocates]. See general4' Bedau,
Juveniles and Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 52
(H. Bedau rev. ed. 1967); Gwin, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual Punishment When Imposed
Upon Juveniles, 45 Ky. BENCH & B., Apr. 1981, at 16.
'3 Brief for Appellant at 64, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
14 Id.
15 102 S. Ct. at 876-77.
16 Id. at 874 n.5.
17 See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
18 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). See also infra notes 69-74 and accompany-
ing text.
19 See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
20 102 S. Ct. at 875-77.
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evidences the Court's desire to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of
imposing the death sentence on juvenile offenders. 21 The Court had to
clear two hurdles in order to decide the case on the basis of the mitigat-
ing factor issue. First, it had to overcome the procedural obstacles posed
by Eddings' failure to raise the mitigating circumstance issue in his peti-
tion for certiorari, and his failure to properly present this issue to the
state appellate court for review.22 Second, it had to interpret the deci-
sions of the lower courts and find that they had refused to consider Ed-
dings' troubled youth and emotional and mental difficulties as
mitigating factors. 23 An analysis of the Court's holdings on these mat-
ters strongly suggests that the Court was determined to decide the case
on some ground other than the certiorari issue. 24 And, as will be seen,
the Court did have reason to want to avoid that controversial
question.2
5
Thus, Eddings v. Oklahoma has two dimensions: decision and avoid-
ance. While the decision itself offers little which is new in the area of
mitigating circumstances, the avoidance of the certiorari question is a
classic example of the Court's improper use of judicial restraint to dodge
questions which it does not want to decide.
A. FACTS
On April 4, 1977, Monty Lee Eddings, a sixteen year old youth, ran
away from his home in Missouri. 26 Eddings, along with several of his
friends, drove without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direc-
tion, eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike.2 7 In the car, Eddings
had a shotgun and several rifles which he had taken from his father.
After Eddings momentarily lost control of the car,28 an Oklahoma
Highway Patrol Officer signalled for Eddings to pull over.29 Eddings did
so. When the officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shot-
gun out of the window and fired, killing the officer. Shortly thereafter,
Eddings was arrested. 30
21 See infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text.
22 See infta notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
24 See inkfa notes 124-49 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
26 102 S. Ct. at 871.
27 Id. at 871-72.
28 Id. Eddings' attention was diverted because he dropped his cigarette and was trying to
find it. The car went over a curb and down into a ditch before Eddings regained control, but
he was able to pull the car back onto the highway and proceed onward. 616 P.2d at 1162.
29 102 S. Ct. at 872. A passerby had reported Eddings' driving incident to the officer, who
then decided to investigate the matter. 616 P.2d at 1163.
30 102 S. Ct. at 872.
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Eddings was certified to stand trial as an adult,3' and found guilty
of first degree murder upon his plea of nolo contendere.32 In accordance
with Oklahoma law,33 a separate sentencing hearing was held to deter-
mine whether Eddings should be sentenced to death or life imprison-
ment. The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides that at this
proceeding, "evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circum-
stances or as to any aggravating circumstance enumerated in the act."
'34
The state introduced evidence to establish the existence of three statu-
tory aggravating circumstances: the heinous nature of the killing; the
commission of the killing to avoid arrest; and the probability that Ed-
dings would commit criminal acts constituting a continuing threat to
society.35 In mitigation, Eddings presented evidence of his troubled
childhood, which was characterized by a broken home,36 lack of paren-
tal supervision, 37 and excessive physical punishment.38 He also
presented the testimony of psychologists and a sociologist who suggested
that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and that his mental and emo-
tional development was less than normal for a person of Eddings' age.
3 9
At the conclusion of the presentation, the trial judge weighed the
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that
the state had proved each of the three alleged aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt.40 First, the judge ruled that the kill-
ing was "heinous, atrocious, and cruel," because it was "'designed to
inflict a high degree of pain in utter indifference to the rights of [the
patrolman].' ",41 The trial judge further held that the crime was "com-
mitted for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prose-
cution," because the officer's intent in stopping the car was to make a
31 Id. Oklahoma law provides that in certain cases, the juvenile court may waive jurisdic-
tion, and certify a minor to stand trial in adult criminal court. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1112(b) (West 1980). See generaly sufra note 7 and accompanying text. The state moved
that Eddings be certified and the juvenile court granted the motion. 102 S. Ct. at 872. This
ruling was affirmed on appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 921 (1978).
32 102 S. Ct. at 872.
33 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1981).
34 Id.
35 102 S. Ct. at 872. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4), (5), (7) (West 1981).
36 Eddings' parents were divorced when he was five years old. 102 S. Ct. at 872.
37 Until he was fourteen, Eddings lived with his mother without rules or supervision.
There was testimony at the sentencing hearing which indicated that his mother might have
been an alcoholic and a prostitute at the time Eddings lived with her. Id.
38 At age fourteen, Eddings went to live with his father, who, according to the testimony
of Eddings' Juvenile Officer, used excessive physical punishment to discipline the youth. Id.
39 These witnesses suggested that Eddings' mental and emotional development might be
at the level of a person several years younger. Id. However, the evidence was not conclusive.
See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
40 Id. at 873.
41 Id. n.3.
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lawful arrest.42 Finally, the judge found that Eddings' threats of vio-
lence, aimed at police officers during his incarceration, 43 established
that Eddings posed a "continuing threat of violence to society."
44
Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the judge
found that Eddings' youth was a factor of great weight.45 He decided,
however, that in light of the serious aggravating circumstances, Eddings'
youth could not persuade the Court to refrain from imposing the death
penalty,46 and added, " '[n]or can the Court in following the law, in my
opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent background.' ,47
The judge proceeded to sentence Eddings to death.
48
Eddings appealed his sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, claiming, inter alia 49 that his punishment was excessive because
the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating ones. 50 The appel-
late court held that the trial judge had correctly determined that Ed-
dings' youth did not overcome the serious aggravating circumstances
which had been established. 5' With regard to other evidence which Ed-
dings had offered in mitigation, the court said that although Eddings'
"personality disorder" and "family history" were "useful in explaining
why he behaved the way he did, [they did] not excuse the behavior.
52
42 Id.
43 According to testimony presented at the sentencing hearing, after Eddings had been
taken to the county jail on the day of the murder, he told two officers that " 'if he was loose
. . . he would shoot' them all." Id. Another time, when an officer refused to turn off the light
in Eddings' cell, Eddings became angry and threatened the officer: "'Now I have shot one of
you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out.'" Id.
44 Id.
45 " 'I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this
particular crime was committed.'" Id. at 873.
46 Id.
47 Id. The interpretation of this quote is a matter of dispute between the Eddings majority
and dissent. See infra notes 65, 91-98 and accompanying text.
48 Id.
49 Eddings raised five additional arguments in his appeal: (1) that it is cruel and unusual
punishment to impose the death penalty on a juvenile offender; (2) that his motion to strike
the bill of particulars regarding the sentence should have been sustained; (3) that none of the
statutory aggravating circumstances were established beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) that the
state suppressed evidence which he could have used to counter one of the aggravating circum-
stances alleged in the bill of particulars; and (5) that he should have been given the services of
an investigator and a psychiatrist at state expense. 616 P.2d at 1163. The appellate court
held against Eddings on each of these claims. Id. at 1171.
50 Id. at 1167, 1169-70.
51 As stated earlier, the District Court indicated great weight had been given to this
factor [his youth] but, nevertheless, found that it could not overbalance the aggravating
circumstances of this case. We, too, have given serious consideration to the petitioner's
youth. But the aggravating circumstances in this case are very serious; and we, too, have
to conclude that the petitioner's youth can not outweigh them.
Id. at 1170.
52 Id. The Eddngs majority and dissent disagreed over the meaning of these remarks. See
infa notes 68, 99-101 and accompanying text.
1982] THE DEATH PENAL TY 1531
The court of criminal appeals affirmed the sentence,53 and Eddings ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.
II. THE EDDINGS OPINION: MAJORITY AND DISSENT
A. THE EDDINGS MAJORITY
As noted earlier, Eddings presented two arguments to the Supreme
Court. Initially, he argued that the eighth5 4 and fourteenth5 5 amend-
ments prohibit the execution of anyone who was a minor at the time of
the offense.5 6 It was on this issue that the Court granted certiorari.
57
53 Id. at 1171.
54 "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55 "[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
eighth amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.1 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1964); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1964).
56 Brief for Appellant at 18-59, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). Eddings
argued that the execution of juvenile offenders violates the eighth amendment because it is
repudiated by society's "evolving standards of decency." Id. The petitioner reviewed the his-
tory of the juvenile justice system, legislative attitudes, and jury sentencing decisions to
demonstrate the "contemporary repudiation of death as a punishment for juvenile offenders."
Id. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (the eighth amendment "must draw its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"). See
also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 330 (Marshall, J., concurring) (suggesting that a
punishment is cruel and unusual if popular sentiment abhors it). But see infa note 150 and
accompanying text.
In addition to the petitioner's brief, two amicus curiae briefs supporting Eddings' argu-
ment were filed. One was filed by the Kentucky Youth Advocates and the Kentucky Office
for Public Advocacy. See Brief of Kentucky Youth Advocates, supra note 12. They argued
that sentencing juvenile offenders to death violates the eighth amendment because the death
penalty is excessive punishment when applied to minors. Id. at 9-11. See Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (established that the eighth amendment prohibits excessive pun-
ishment). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
279 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Kentucky Youth Advocates also argued that it is cruel
and unusual punishment to submit a child to the evironment of death row, because children
are likely to have their sentences commuted, and their experience on death row is likely to
cause them irreparable psychological trauma. Brief of Kentucky Youth Advocates, supra note
12, at 11-13. See generally Gallemore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confe-
ment, 129 AM. J. Psy. 81 (1972); Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row
Confinement, 5 LAw & PSYCH. REV. 141 (1979); Note, Mental Sufering Under Sentence of Death: A
Cruel and Unusual unishment, 57 IowA L. REV. 814 (1972).
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, and the American Orthopsychiatric Association also filed an amicus curiae brief
supporting Eddings' eighth amendment argument. See Brief of National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, supra note 12. They argued that sentencing minors to death was excessive
punishment and therefore violates the eighth amendment, and also claimed that certification
of a minor for trial in adult court does not indicate that the minor is mature, sophisticated, or
should be treated as though he were an adult. Id. at 13-19.
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However, in his brief, Eddings introduced a second argument: he
claimed, for the first time, that his sentence was also unconstitutional
because the sentencing judge had refused to consider his troubled child-
hood and emotional and mental difficulties as mitigating factors. 58 De-
spite the objections of four of the justices,59 the majority agreed to
address Eddings' new argument, maintaining that the issue was prop-
erly before the Court since the state had responded to the argument in
its briefro and since Eddings had presented the issue to the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals in his petition for rehearing.6'
In considering Eddings' mitigating factor claim, the majority held,
again over the strenuous objections of the dissenting justices,62 that both
the trial court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had re-
fused to consider Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional
problems in mitigation of the death penalty.63 Relying solely on the
trial judge's statement that " 'in following the law' "he could not "'con-
sider . . . this young man's violent background,' "64 the Court con-
cluded that it was "clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact," but that
"he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the
evidence. '65 In the opinion of the majority, the appellate court had
taken the same approach.66 The court of criminal appeals said that
while Eddings' family history and personality disorder were "useful in
explaining his behavior," they did not "excuse" it.67 The Supreme
Court interpreted these remarks to mean that the appellate court "con-
sidered only that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support
a legal excuse from criminal liability."m8
Having decided the factual question, the Court then reversed the
57 450 U.S. at 1040.
58 See Brief for Appellant at 64, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
59 See infta notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
60 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9. See also Brief for Respondent at 53-57, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102
S. Ct. 869 (1982).
61 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9. Although the court of criminal appeals denied the petition for
rehearing, it stated that it had given the matter full consideration and had been "'fully ad-
vised in the premises.'" Id. But see in/a notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, advised that even if the issue had not been
properly raised and reviewed below, the Supreme Court could consider it "'in the interests of
justice."' Id. at 878 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
265 n.5 (1981)). See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
63 102 S. Ct. at 875.
64 Id.
65 Id. (emphasis in original).
66 Id.
67 616 P.2d at 1170.
68 102 S. Ct. at 875.
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lower courts on the ground that Lockett v. Ohio69 required that the sen-
tencer consider Eddings' troubled youth and emotional and mental dif-
ficulties in mitigation of the death penalty. 70 In Lockett, the plurality
had held that the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer. . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."' Because the Ohio death penalty statute72 only per-
mitted consideration of the three mitigating circumstances enumerated
in the act, 73 the Court declared the statute to be invalid.
74
The Eddings Court explained that the rule in Lockett was the prod-
uct of the "law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the unique-
ness of the individual. '75 Tracing its pre-Lockett decisions, the Court
noted that Fuman v. Georgia76 held discretionary death sentencing un-
guided by any legislative standards to be unconstitutional, because such
unbridled discretion had led to arbitrary and capricious sentencing deci-
sions.77 However, the Court pointed out that in subsequent decisions it
had recognized that while the eighth amendment requires standards
69 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
70 102 S. Ct. at 875-77.
71 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
72 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.04 (Page 1975).
73 The three mitigating factors specified in the statute were: (1) the victim induced or
facilitated the offense; (2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed but for
the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and (3) the of-
fense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency. Id.
§ 2929.04(B). •
The Lockett Court noted that the Ohio statute prohibited the sentencer from considering,
in mitigation, factors such as the defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense or his
youth. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
74 Id.
75 102 S. Ct. at 874.
76 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
77 102 S. Ct. at 874. Prior to Furman, most death penalty statutes were completely discre-
tionary and provided no guidelines or standards. See Note, Discretion and Constitutionality of the
New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1690 (1974). See also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. at 874; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 597-98. Thus, Furman rendered
almost every death penalty statute in the country void, and paved the way for the develop-
ment of legislative guidelines in death penalty sentencing. For commentaries on Furman, see
Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Prelimina Comment, 48 WASH. L. REV. 95 (1972); Polsby,
The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Note, The Death
Penaly-The Alternatives Left After Furman o. Georgia, 37 ALB. L REv. 344 (1973); Comment,
The Furman Care: What Life is Left in the Death Penalty?, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 651 (1973);
Comment, Capital Punishment Afler Faman, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 281 (1973); Note,
Furman v. Georgia-Deathknellfor Capital Punishment?, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 107 (1972); Note,
The Death Penalty as Presently Administered Under Discretionagy Sentencing Statutes is Cruel and Unu-
sual, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 244 (1972); Note, Death Penalty as Currenty Administered Constitutes
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1167 (1973).
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and guidelines, it also requires that the circumstances of the particular
offense together with the character of the individual defendant be taken
into account.
78
Applying the rule of Lockett, the Court held that just as the state
cannot by statute preclude a sentencer from considering mitigating fac-
tors, neither may the sentencer exclude mitigating evidence by refusing
to consider it.79 Further, the Court found that a youthful defendant's
troubled childhood and lack of emotional and mental maturity are miti-
gating factors.80 Youth is well-established as a mitigating circumstance
precisely because it evidences impressionability and a lack of maturity
and judgment.8t The Court asserted that it therefore follows that a
child's exposure to a neglectful and violent environment during these
impressionable years, and a child's failure to attain a level of emotional
and mental maturity commensurate to his own chronological age have a
"particularly relevant" bearing on his character and must be considered
as mitigating factors.
8 2
Based on this analysis, the Court held that the sentence imposed on
Eddings was unconstitutional,8 3 and remanded the case to the
Oklahoma trial court for further proceedings.8 4 Having decided the
78 102 S. Ct. at 874. The Court cited Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), as
one instance in which it held that mandatory death penalty statutes were not a permissible
response to the Furman problem of arbitrary sentencing discretion, because such statutes do
not permit consideration of the "character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense." Id. at 304. The Court also pointed to Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia death penalty
statute which required that the jury find at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed
in the act before it could sentence anyone to death, but which, at the same time, allowed the
jury to consider any mitigating circumstance proffered by the defendant. Id. at 206-07. See
also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-36 (Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it did not permit the sentencer to
consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276 (Texas statute constitutional because it authorizes jury considera-
tion of individual mitigating circumstances and provides adequate guidance by requiring
that the jury find at least one aggravating circumstance before it can sentence a defendant to
death); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 252, 259-60 (Florida statute constitutional because it
directs the trial judge's attention to individual circumstances of both defendant and crime,
and appellate process and aggravating circumstance requirement ensure against arbitrary
imposition of death sentence).
79 102 S. Ct. at 875-76. The Court noted that the Oklahoma death penalty statute per-
mits the defendant to present evidence as to any mitigating circumstance, and added that
"Lockett requires the sentencer to listen." Id. at 876 n.10.
80 Id. at 876-77.
81 Id. See infta notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
82 Id. See inf/a notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
83 Id. at 877.
84 Id. The Court cautioned that although the sentencer and the court of criminal appeals
may determine the weight to be given to Eddings' mitigating evidence, "they may not give it
no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration." Id. at 876 (footnote
omitted).
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case on these grounds, the Court, in accordance with the doctrine of
judicial restraint,85 did not address the certiorari issue regarding the
constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to death.
8 6
B. THE EDDINGS DISSENT
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist, objected strenuously to the majority's decision. 87 The disa-
greement stemmed not from the question of law decided, but from per-
ceived procedural improprieties and the majority's interpretation of the
lower courts' decisions.
Regarding procedure, the dissent objected to the Court's willing-
ness to consider the petitioner's Locket claim.88 The dissent argued that
the Lockett issue was not properly before the Court because it had not
been presented in Eddings' petition for certiorari, and had not been
properly presented to the Oklahoma courts for review.8 9
On the substantive issue, the dissent, unlike the majority, found
that the trial judge and the court of criminal appeals had considered
Eddings' troubled childhood and emotional and mental difficultiesY0
The dissent claimed that the majority had strained its reading of the
lower courts' opinions in order to "make out a violation of Locke/i."9
Focusing first on the majority's reading of the trial court's opinion, the
dissent criticized the majority for relying entirely on one isolated remark
made by the trial judge that the court could not be " 'persuaded entirely
by the. . . fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous
crime was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in my
opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent background.' "92
According to the dissent, the majority's interpretation of this comment
ignored the trial court's expenditure of considerable time receiving the
85 See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
86 102 S. Ct. at 874 n.5. Justice Brennan wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he
pointed out that although he joined in the Court's opinion, he did not depart from his view
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 877 (Brennan, J., concurring). See alro Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 229-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion in order "to address more fully the
reasons why this case must be remanded in light of Lockett v. Ohio." Eddings v. Oklahoma,
102 S. Ct. at 877 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation ommitted). She stressed that justice
required that the case be remanded to ensure that all mitigating circumstances have been
considered so that the death penalty would not be erroneously imposed. Id. at 878. See infa
notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
87 Id. at 879 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88 Id.
89 Id. See inf/a notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
90 Id. at 881-83.
91 Id. at 881. See infa notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
92 102 S. Ct. at 881.
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testimony of a probation officer and various mental health professionals
who described Eddings' personality and family history: "an obviously
meaningless exercise, if, as the Court asserts, the judge believed he was
barred 'as a matter of law' from considering their testimony. ' 93 The
dissent also complained that the majority failed to consider that the
judge delivered his opinion extemporaneously from the bench and could
not be expected "to frame each utterance with the specificity and preci-
sion that might be expected of a written opinion or statute.
94
The Chief Justice further argued that even when examined in isola-
tion, the trial court's statement was ambiguous.95 In the first place, "it is
not even clear what the trial court meant by Eddings' 'violent back-
ground.' "96 Since there had been testimony that Eddings often got into
fights and had once been charged with assault with intent to do great
bodily harm, the dissent suggested that the trial judge might have been
referring to these incidents.97 Secondly, the dissent asserted that the
judge's comments could just as easily have been understood as saying
that while the court had taken account of Eddings' youth and his unfor-
tunate childhood and personality problems, it did not consider any of
these factors sufficient to offset the serious aggravating circumstances
which had been established. 98
Turning to the majority's reading of the court of criminal appeals'
opinion, the dissent again accused the majority of relying entirely on a
few isolated comments.9 The dissent criticized the majority for ignoring
the careful attention which the appellate court had given to the evi-
dence of Eddings' troubled childhood and mental problems, and sug-
gested that this was something the court would have been unlikely to do
had it found the evidence to be "irrelevant." o100 According to the dis-
sent, the appellate court's statements reflected nothing more than the
conclusion that Eddings' background and personality problems were not
sufficient to tip the scales, given the serious aggravating circumstances
established beyond a reasonable doubt. "The Court's opinion offers no
reasonable explanation for its assumption that the court of criminal ap-
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. (footnote omitted).
96 Id. at 881 n.5. Although in its brief the state seemed to concede that the court was
probably referring, at least in part, to Eddings' family history, at oral argument the state
maintained that the remark was ambiguous and could have meant that the trial court was
not going to consider Eddings' extensive juvenile record. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 881.
99 Id. at 881-82.
10 Id. at 882. The dissent noted that the court of criminal appeals had spent several
paragraphs summarizing the evidence of Eddings' troubled childhood and emotional
problems in its opinion. Se 616 P.2d at 1169-70.
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peals considered itself bound by some unstated legal principle not to
'consider' Eddings' background." 10 1
Therefore, the dissent concluded that Eddings' sentence should
have been affirmed, since it was not inconsistent with Lockett for the
sentencing body to have found that Eddings' family background and
personality problems did not outweigh the serious aggravating circum-
stances which were established. 10
2
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court's resolution of the Eddings case merely required the ap-
plication of rules established years before. By holding that the eighth
amendment prohibits a sentencer from excluding relevant mitigating
evidence, the Court did not broaden the Lockett rule; rather, the Court
applied the rule in a manner wholly consistent with the spirit underly-
ing its creation. If the legislature cannot limit the category of circum-
stances which may be considered in mitigation, it certainly follows that
the sentencer should not be able to either. Thus, while an affirmation of
the Court's position that the eighth amendment requires individual con-
sideration in capital sentencing, 03 the Eddings holding breaks no new
ground.104
Likewise, the Court's holding that a juvenile defendant's troubled
childhood and emotional and mental difficulties are mitigating factors
was also the result of applying previously established rules and guide-
lines. In Lockett, the Court defined a mitigating factor to be "any aspect
of a defendant's character. . and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." 10 5 In addition to this definition, the Court has provided exam-
ples of the kind of personality traits and circumstances which would be
101 102 S. Ct. at 882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 882-83.
103 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
104 For commentaries on Lockett and individualized consideration in capital sentencing, see
Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the
Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating
Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 317 (1981); Comment, Evolutions of the Eighth Amendment and
Standards for the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 351 (1979); Note, Right of a
Defendant to Have any Relevant Aspect of His Character and Circumstances of Offense Used as Factors
Mitigating a Death Sentence, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1147 (1979).
105 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted). See supra note 71 and accompany-
ing text. This definition assumes that the particular characteristic or circumstance proffered
is of such a nature that it would justify a lesser penalty. It is unthinkable, for example, that a
sentencer would give a lesser penalty because the defendant introduces, in mitigation, evi-
dence of his violent behavior and previous arrests and convictions. Yet, this evidence would
have a bearing on his character.
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mitigating factors.'0 6 In Eddings, the Court relied on one of its well-
established examples-youth.10 7 It reasoned that since youth is a miti-
gating factor, a juvenile defendant's troubled childhood and lack of
emotional and mental maturity must be mitigating factors as well.
The Court's analysis was indeed correct. The recognition of youth
as a mitigating factor is the product of the general recognition by the
courts that the law should treat minors differently from adults. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that children and adoles-
cents are not always entitled to the same constitutional rights as
adults.108 Because youths are impressionable and lack the maturity and
experience of their elders, the Court has limited their first amendment
rights by restricting access to reading materials which the state defines
as obscene for minors, but not for adults. 10 9 Moreover, the Court has
upheld restrictive child labor laws 110 and denied female minors the pri-
vacy rights that are afforded to adult women in the context of abor-
tion.'1 ' Finally, in the area of juvenile justice, the Court has upheld
statutory schemes which fail to provide youths with rights fundamental
to adult criminal defendants on the grounds that youths are better
served by a system that recognizes their immaturity and amenability to
regenerative treatment. 112
106 See, e.g., id. at 608 (defendant's youth and comparatively minor role in the offense); Bell
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1978) (defendant's cooperation with the police); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. at 273 (quoting Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (1975)) (defendant's
lack of a prior criminal record; defendant's action occurred under duress or domination of
another).
107 Not only has the Supreme Court frequently asserted that youth is a mitigating factor,
see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 608; Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 641-42; Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. at 273; Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-58, but appellate courts have often reduced
sentences because of the youth of the defendant. E.g., State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464
P.2d 793, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); People v. Wilkins, 36 Ill. App. 3d 761, 344 N.E.2d 724 (1976);
Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); State v. Coughlin, 176 Mont. 7A
(1978); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); Commonwealth v. Green, 396
Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
108 In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979), the Court noted that the constitutional
rights of children and adults could not be equated, in view of "the peculiar vulnerability of
children," and their "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner."
Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Children have
a very special place in life which the law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in
other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a
State's duty towards children").
109 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
'to See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
111 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
112 The juvenile justice system denies minors certain rights which are made available to
adult defendants, such as the right to a jury. Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
the constitutionality of the juvenile justice scheme, maintaining that minors are better served
by a non- adversarial, informal, and protective proceeding. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
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The theme which pervades these decisions is that the Constitution
provides states with wide latitude in protecting minors because of their
vulnerability and immaturity."I3 Pursuant to this authority, legislatures
have acted to restrain minors from exercising certain rights to ensure
that they avoid the harm which could result from youthful
irresponsibility. 
14
For similar reasons, many courts and commentators have con-
cluded that juveniles who are placed in the adult criminal system con-
tinue to deserve special treatment and protection. For instance, it has
frequently been asserted that juveniles deserve less severe punishment
than adults since minors have less capacity to control their conduct and
to think in long-range terms.It5 Moreover, because youths are particu-
larly impressionable, their crimes may not be exclusively their fault, but
may also represent "a failure of family, school, and the social system
which share responsibility in the development of America's youth.""
16
Juveniles may also deserve greater leniency because they are still in the
113 Psychologists and sociologists have long shared the Supreme Court's opinion that youth
evidences impressionability and a lack of maturity. See, e.g., E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND
SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963); E. PEEL, THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENT JUDGEMENT (1971); J.
PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (1966); M. RU'TER, CHANGING YOUTH IN
A CHANGING SOCIETY: PATTERNS OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND DISORDER (1980);
Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT RESEARCH (Hoofman ed. 1964); Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnany
Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980); Rest, Davison & Robbins, Age Trends in
Judging Moral Issues: A Review of Cross-Sectional, Longitudinal, and Sequential Studies of the Defiing
Issues Test, 49 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 263 (1978); Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood- Conceptions
of Child Development and Social Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38 (1975).
114 For example, states have enacted statutes which prohibit minors from purchasing alco-
hol and cigarettes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308(a) (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 562.11 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-949, 18-1502A (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 134(a) (Smith-hurd 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1980).
115 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 41 (1967) (while
minors must be held responsible for their misconduct, the level of juvenile responsibility is
lower than for adults); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, CONFRONTING YOUTH
CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POL-
ICY TOWARD YOUTH OFFENDERS 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK
FORCE REPORT] (although young offenders should be held legally responsible for intentional
criminal harms, they "deserve less punishment because adolescents.., have less capacity to
control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults"; it is "unrealistic to treat
young offenders as if they have fully mature judgment and control"). See also State v. Malo-
ney, 105 Ariz. at 360, 464 P.2d at 805 ("The defendant has committed a heinous crime, the
sheer brutality of which unquestionably shocked the jury. . . . Had he been of mature age
the death penalty would have gone undisturbed by this court. . . .Because of his immatur-
ity we are persuaded that he should not die'); State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 187, 261 P.2d
997, 1000 (1953) (court reduces rape sentence because "[d]efendant was approximately 17
years of age at the time, immature both in judgment and in the exercise of discretion'); State
v. Spinks, 66 N.J. 568, 334 A.2d 23 (1975) (court affirms sentence reduction fdr armed rob-
bery because defendant's young age evidenced immaturity and lack of judgment).
116 TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 115, at 7.
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early stages of moral development, 1 7 and, therefore, are more amenable
to rehabilitation than are adults.18
The same considerations which make youth a mitigating factor in
sentencing also indicate that a juvenile's lack of emotional and mental
maturity and his troubled childhood should be mitigating factors. If
youth is mitigating because it evidences immaturity, and hence a lim-
ited capacity to control conduct and to think in long-range terms, then a
juvenile defendant's abnormally immature level of emotional and
mental development must also be mitigating. Such a juvenile may be
even less culpable than his peer, who, while still immature, is at least at
the proper stage of development.
Furthermore, since youth is a mitigating factor because it evidences
impressionability, it follows that a minor's exposure to a neglectful, and
sometimes even violent, family environment during his formative years
should be a mitigating factor as well. In such situations, the impression-
able youth's behavior is not his fault alone; it also represents the failure
of the family, which did not provide him with proper attention and gui-
dance, and of the school and social system, which failed to counteract
the negative influences he was exposed to at home. 19 In fact, many
117 See E. PEEL, supra note 113, at 131-34 (child's ability to think abstractly and to engage
in mature judgment continues to develop into late adolescence and early adulthood). There
is also a considerable body of research which demonstrates that a person's ability to think in
moral terms and to engage in moral judgments reaches a plateau only after leaving school or
reaching early adulthood. See, e.g., M. RUTER, supra note 113, at 238; Kohlberg, supra note
113, at 404-05; Rest, Davison & Robbins, supra note 113, at 276-77.
118 See People v. Wilkins, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 344 N.E.2d at 729 (court reduces murder
sentence: "At the time of trial the defendant was 17 years of age and had no prior criminal
record. . . . Although the nature of the crime is extremely serious, the sentence imposed does
not adequately reflect the possibility of the defendant's rehabilitation"); Workman v. Com-
monwealth, 429 S.W.2d at 378 (court reduces sentence of life imprisonment without parole
for rapist: "[t]he intent of the legislature was to deal with the incorrigible individual who
presented a constant threat to society"; "incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth"); People v.
Hiemel, 49 A.D.2d 769, 770, 372 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (1975) (court reduces sentence for first
degree murder where the sixteen year old defendant has used time in prison to become "a
classic example of the rehabilitation heights attainable within our existing penal system by an
inmate desirous of taking advantage of the education facilities available"); State v. Coughlin,
176 Mont. at 7A (court reduces sentence because defendant is young and likely to be rehabili-
tated). See also The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976). Under
this Act, federal judges are obligated to consider the special rehabilitative sentencing alterna-
tives created by the Act before sentencing any person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
two. The Act was expressly "designed to provide a better method for treating young offend-
ers convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket, to rehabilitate them and restore
normal behavior patterns." Dorszinski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1974).
119 See TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 115, at 7. The connection
between adolescent violence and crime and the family environment has been validated by
research. For example, a recent study, to be published in a forthcoming issue of the The
American Journal of Psychiatly, suggests that the violent criminal behavior of adolescents is
linked to the effects of abuse and violence in their families. See Collins. The Violent Child.- Some
Patterns Emerge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1982, § Y (Style), at 20. Numerous lawmakers have also
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courts recognized the mitigating effect of this situation long before Ed-
dings was decided.
120
Thus, the Eddings Court neither broadened nor narrowed the Lock-
et rule or the definition of mitigating circumstances. Rather, the
Court's decision represents a reaffirmation of the Court's commitment to
individualized sentencing decisions in capital cases and to a definition of
mitigating circumstances which permits the capital sentencer to make a
fully informed decision. Yet, this affirmation of Lockett may be of great
importance, since Lockett has been criticized as signalling a return to the
pre-Furman12 t days of arbitrary discretion in death penalty sentenc-
ing.122 The root of the problem, according to these critics, is that while
Lockett mandates the consideration of mitigating factors, it also leaves
the sentencing body with complete discretion in deciding how much
weight to attribute to these factors and how to balance these factors
against the aggravating factors present in each case. While these issues
were not raised in Eddings, the Court implied it would continue to stand
by its Lockett position and leave the weighing process in the hands of the
lower courts.
123
B. THE COURT'S AVOIDANCE
Analysis of the Eddings decision also reveals that the Court pre-
ferred to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of imposing the death
recognized that parents share in the responsibility for the crimes and other wrongful acts
committed by their children. Many municipalities have enacted statutes which hold parents
liable for acts of their children. In Deerfield, Illinois, for example, a 1975 parental responsi-
bility ordinance makes parents liable for failing to prevent their children from committing
crimes and violating local laws. Parents may be fined up to $500.00 for not controlling their
children's behavior. See Deerfield, Ill., Code § 15-S-64 (1975). In Naperville, Illinois, a van-
dalism ordinance requires that parents or legal guardians make restitution to victims for the
vandalism of their children. See Naperville, Ill., Code § 24.031 (1978). Seegeneral Lipinski, A
Growing Mlovemen: Making Parents Pay When Kids are Bad, Chi. Tribune, Sept. 26, 1982, § 12
(Tempo), at 1.
120 See, e.g., People v. Howell, 16 111. App. 3d 989, 994, 307 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1974) (court
reduces attempted murder sentence: "This is his first felony conviction. . . . Many of his
problems may have stemmed from an unstable family life. . . ."); State v. Blanton, 166 N.J.
Super. 62, 398 A.2d 1328 (1979) (court reduces sentence for assault and battery of police
officer because of defendant's youth and his disadvantaged background); Mattino v. State,
539 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (court reverses denial of probation of larceny
sentence to a young defendant: "The defendant is a first offender with no criminal record of
any kind. . . . He comes from a broken home and had dropped out of high school after the
tenth grade. .. 2).
121 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Radin, Cruel Pumishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1980). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 622-24 (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123 "On remand, the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evidence and weigh
it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for
them." 102 S. Ct. at 877.
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penalty on juvenile offenders. The Court's willingness to abandon its
well-established procedures and its interpretation of the lower court
opinions indicate that the Court was determined to decide the case on
the basis of Eddings' Lockett claim, thereby sidestepping the issue on
which it had granted certiorari.
1. Supreme Court Procedure
The introduction of Eddings' Lockett argument posed two proce-
dural obstacles for the Court. The first was Eddings' failure to include
the claim in his petition for certiorari. 124 The Court has traditionally
refused to consider issues not properly presented on petition for certio-
rari, 125 and has incorporated this practice in Rule 40 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court.1 26 The only exception to this rule is that the Court may
entertain, at its option, a "plain error" which had not been presented. 127
The Eddings majority, however, did not rely on the plain error excep-
tion 12 8 and, in fact, offered no explanation for circumventing the Court's
own rules of procedure.
129
Eddings' failure to present his Lockett claim to the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals in his initial appeal posed the second procedural
obstacle. 130 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it will not de-
cide questions which have not been considered below. 13 To overcome
124 See 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9.
125 See, e.g., Dickinson Industrial Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 389 (1940); General Talking
Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1938). See also Bice, The Limited
Grant of Certiorari and theJustifcation ofJudicial Review, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 343, 345; Note, Scope
of Supreme Court Review.: The Teminiello Case in Focus, 59 YALE LJ. 971 (1950).
126 "The phrasing of the questions presented [in the brief] need not be identical with that
set forth in. . . the petition for certiorari, but the brief may not raise additional questions or
change the substance of the questions already presented in those documents. Questions not
presented according to this paragraph will be disregarded. ... Sup. CT. R. 40(1)(d)(2).
127 Id.
128 But see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
129 The only comment the Court made regarding this procedural irregularity was to point
out that both sides had addressed the Lockett issue in their briefs. 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9.
Although this indicated that neither side would be at a disadvantage when the Court enter-
tained the argument, it does not explain why the Court believed it was appropriate to ignore
established practice in this case.
The Court has, on rare occasions, entertained an argument not presented in the petition
for certiorari without relying on the plain error rule and without giving any explanations for
abandoning its established procedure. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). However, such procedural improprieties have
always been met with strenuous objections from members of the Court. See Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. at 771-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. at 8
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Moreover, the infrequency of such impropriety suggests that it is
by no means an accepted practice of the Court.
130 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9.
131 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1969); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 243-44 (1958); McGoldrick v. Compagne Generale, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1939); Duignan v.
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this obstacle, the Eddings Court relied on Eddings' inclusion of the issue
in his petition to the court of criminal appeals for rehearing. 132 In the
past, however, the attempt to raise a question after judgment, upon a
petition for rehearing, has been held to come too late, unless the court
actually entertains the question and decides it. 133 Although the
Oklahoma court stated that it gave Eddings' petition for rehearing full
consideration and was " 'fully advised in the premises,' "when it denied
his request, 134 the Supreme Court has previously held that such com-
ments do not indicate that the lower court ruled upon the question;
rather, the Court has held that such comments reveal nothing more
than a denial of the motion for rehearing. 3 5 Thus, the Court's decision
to entertain Eddings' Lockett claim does not square with its earlier
United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927). See also R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 208-30 (5th ed. 1978); R. WOLFSON & P. KURKLAND, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 106-60 (1951).
132 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9.
133 See Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 443 (1934); Radio Station W.O.W. v. Johnson,
326 U.S. 120, 128 (1944); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1932). See
generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, subra note 131, at 220; R. WOLFSON & P. KURKLAND,
supra note 131, at 129.
134 102 S. Ct. at 876 n.9.
135 In Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk & O.V.R. Co., 228 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1913), the
lower court, in denying the motion for rehearing, stated that it had "'maturely considered
the petition.'" The Supreme Court found that the "words 'maturely considered' do not im-
port any decision of the question made." The Court, therefore, refused to consider the issue.
See aLso Forbes v. State Council of Virginia, 216 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1909). Cf. Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476 (1975) (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231
Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973)) (where the federal question had been raised for the
first time in a motion for rehearing in the highest state court, the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction was held properly invoked by virtue of the state court's express holding, in deny-
ing rehearing, that "'[a] majority of this court does not consider this statute to be in conflict
with the First Amendment' "); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1964) (where the
federal constitutional claims apparently were first raised in a motion for re-argument, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the New York Court of Appeals granted a motion
to amend the remittitur to demonstrate that the federal claims had been passed upon in
denying the motion).
There are situations where raising a question for the first time in the petition for rehear-
ing is timely even though the state court says nothing in denying the petition. If, for example,
the question is created by an unexpected decision of the highest state court or the United
States Supreme Court, giving the litigant no prior opportunity to anticipate or assert the
particular question, the petition for rehearing constitutes his first and probably his only
chance to present the matter to that court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court will exercise its
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1935); Great Northern R.R.
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1932); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673, 677-78 (1930).
Eddings' Lockett claim does not fit into this exception. Eddings was sentenced to death
by the trial judge in May of 1977, a year before Lockett was decided. However, the court of
criminal appeals did not render judgment until March 21, 1980, two years after the Lockett
decision. Thus, Eddings had ample opportunity to bring his Lockett claim to the attention of




2. The Interpretation of the Lower Court Decisions
In addition to these procedural improprieties, evidence of the ma-
jority's desire to avoid the certiorari issue is provided by its interpreta-
tion of the lower court opinions. As the dissent pointed out, the majority
strained its reading of the lower court opinions in order to "make out" a
Lockett violation:137 the majority relied solely on a couple of ambiguous
statements of the lower courts and it ignored the fact that, even ex-
amined in isolation, the statements could very easily have been read to
mean that the courts simply concluded that the proffered mitigating cir-
cumstances did not outweigh the serious aggravating circumstances
which had been established. 138
In addition to the dissent's observations, there is further evidence
suggesting that the Court strained to find a Lockett violation. First, an
examination of the trial court record reveals that Eddings' emotional
and mental difficulties were by no means conclusively demonstrated. 39
It therefore appears the trial judge may have considered the evidence,
but found it insufficient to overcome the serious aggravating circum-
stances which had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The major-
ity, however, completely ignored the comparative weakness of Eddings'
proffered mitigating evidence.' 40
Second, even if the Supreme Court was justified in finding that the
trial court had refused to consider the evidence in mitigation, the major-
ity appears to have misinterpreted the appellate court's decision. The
appellate court apparently did consider the mitigating factors, as it was
required to do under Lockett, even devoting a separate section of its opin-
ion to them.' 41 After spending several paragraphs detailing the evidence
136 But see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 9 1-101 and accompanying text.
139 Dr. Dietsche, a psychologist, testified that if forced to extrapolate from a standard intel-
ligence scale
he would place [Eddings'] 'mental age' at about fourteen years, six months: however, he
then said that this mental age would have 'no meaning' since 'the mental age concepts
break down . . . between fourteen and sixteen years of age.' He went on to state: 'My
opinion is that [Eddings] has the intelligence of an adult. . . .' Describing a single inter-
view with petitioner while he was awaiting trial . . . Dr. Rettig, a sociologist, said that
petitioner's 'responses appeared to me to be several years below his chronological age'; he
'qualiflied]' this answer, however, by noting that [Eddings] was 'under a great deal of
constraint in the atmosphere in which I saw him.'
102 S. Ct. at 880 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
140 It is of interest to note that the majority overstated and oversimplified the evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing by stating categorically that Eddings' "mental and emo-
tional development were at a level several years below his age." See 102 S. Ct. at 872, 877.
141 See 616 P.2d at 1169-70.
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of Eddings' troubled childhood and his psychological and emotional
problems, 142 the appellate court went on to weigh the factors pleaded in
mitigation against the aggravating factors established in the case.
The appellate court first looked to Eddings' youth. It said it was
giving "serious consideration to the petitioner's youth," but that the ag-
gravating circumstances in the case were so serious that Eddings' youth
could not outweigh them. 143 After considering the evidence of Eddings'
troubled childhood and emotional problems, the court found that Ed-
dings suffered from a personality disorder.'" It held, however, that
neither this disorder nor the petitioner's family history was such as to
excuse his behavior. In saying that "all the evidence tends to show that
[the petitioner] knew the difference between right and wrong at the time
he pulled the trigger, [which] is the test of criminal responsibility in this
State,"'145 the appellate court was supporting its conclusion that the mit-
igating factors being considered were not such as to outweigh the aggra-
vating factors. That this conclusion is couched in terms of the
petitioner's responsibility for his crime is merely a sign that the court
had been particularly impressed by the fact that Eddings appeared to
have known exactly what he was doing when he committed a crime
which had been characterized as "heinous, atrocious and cruel."' 46 Al-
though it is unfortunate that the court used language commonly used in
connection with an absolute defense to criminal responsibility, it would
appear in the context of the entire opinion that the court concluded only
that the mitigating factors pleaded were outweighed by the aggravating
ones.
Concentrating on the appellate court's remark that criminal re-
sponsibility depends on knowledge of the difference between right and
wrong, the Eddings majority concluded that the appellate court had not
considered Eddings' evidence in mitigation, because it had "considered
only that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a legal
excuse from criminal liability."' 147 To reach this conclusion, the majority
had to ignore completely the section in the opinion in which the appel-
late court noted that the petitioner's youth was a mitigating factor of
great weight; 148after all, youth is not a legal excuse from criminal liabil-
142 Se id.
143 Id. at 1170.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1167-68.
147 102 S. Ct. at 875.
148 As stated, earlier, the District Court indicated great weight had been given to [the
defendant's youth] but, nevertheless, found it could not overbalance the aggravating cir-
cumstances of the case. We, too, have given serious consideration to the petitioner's
youth. But the aggravating circumstances in this case are very serious; and we, too, have
to conclude that the petitioner's youth cannot outweigh them.
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ity.149 The majority also had to ignore the context of the remark on
legal responsibility which attracted its attention. The Supreme Court's
conclusion would appear, therefore, to be the result of a strained reading
of the appellate court's opinion, rather than a close analysis of the deci-
sion under review.
3. Judicial Restraint
The Court's apparent eagerness to find a Locket violation suggests
it was determined to avoid the issue of whether it is constitutional to
impose the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Indeed, the majority
had reason to want to avoid the issue. Eddings' eighth amendment ar-
gument raised many difficult problems for the Court: it asked the Court
to re-examine the standard used in applying the eighth amendment;1 50
it challenged the legitimacy of the certification process by which
juveniles are transferred to criminal courts and treated as adults;' 5' and
it asked the Court to perform the difficult task of determining at what
age someone is so fully responsible for his criminal actions that the death
penalty may be the appropriate and acceptable penalty. 152 Moreover, it
is possible that sympathetic justices may have wanted to avoid the issue
for fear that Eddings' sentence would be affirmed and a harsh new
chapter in the law of capital punishment would be promulgated if this
question were decided.
153
616 P.2d at 1170.
149 Although youth may lead the courts to treat the defendant differently in terms of pun-
ishment, see supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text, it does not absolve the defendant of
criminal liability. Most states retain the common law presumption that children over four-
teen know the difference between right and wrong, and are capable of criminal intention. See
W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 6.12 (6th ed. 1958); J.
MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 837-40 (2d
ed. 1969); Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of thejuvenile Wurderer, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 113;
Kean, The Histoov of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REv. 364 (1937).
150 The petitioner claimed that the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders
was cruel and unusual punishment because it was repudiated by society's "evolving standards
of decency." See supra note 56 and accompanying text. However, the Supreme Court has
never relied on that standard alone when finding that a particular form of punishment vio-
lated the eighth amendment. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376 (1982) (popular
opinion must weigh in the balance, but is not decisive); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182
(public perceptions regarding a particular punishment are not conclusive in determining
whether a punishment violates the eighth amendment).
151 Although the petitioner did not explicitly challenge the transfer process, such a chal-
lenge was implied in his argument. By transferring juveniles to criminal courts, the state is
allowing juveniles to be treated as adults. The petitioner's position assumed that in terms of
criminal penalties juveniles should not be treated as adults.
152 The petitioner recognized the difficulty of this task, pointing out in his brief: "The
problem, of course, here as elsewhere in the evolution of constitutional law, resides in drawing
the line. Shall it be 12, 15, 18, 20?" Brief for Appellant at 59, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S.
Ct. 869 (1982).
153 This possibility is suggested by comments made in the dissenting and concurring opin-
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It is certainly not unusual for the Court to avoid the resolution of
constitutional questions of first impression. 54 In fact, the doctrine of
judicial restraint, adhered to by the Court, encourages such avoid-
ance.155 The main tenet of this doctrine is that the Court should not
rule on an unresolved constitutional question if there is some other
ground on which to decide the case.1
56
ions. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, maintained that the "Court's opinion makes clear
that some Justices who join it woold not have imposed the death penalty had they sat as the
sentencing authority." 102 S. Ct. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion, noted that the "Chief Justice may be correct in concluding that the
Court's opinion reflects a decision by some Justices that they would not have imposed the
death penalty in this case had they sat as trial judge." Id. at 878-79 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). This observation is certainly supported by the previous positions taken by some mem-
bers of the majority. Justice Brennan has uniformly taken the position that the death penalty
is always unconstitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 230-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma,
102 S. Ct. at 877 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall has also taken that position. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Powell, who wrote
the Eddings majority opinion, appears to be particularly sympathetic to Eddings' situation:
"We are concerned here. . . with the manner of the imposition of the ultimate penalty: the
death sentence imposed for the crime of murder upon an emotionally disturbed youth with a
disturbed child's immaturity." 102 S.Ct. at 877.
Moreover, the fear that Eddings sentence would have been affirmed appears to be well-
founded; at least four of the justices would have found that the imposition of the death pen-
alty on an offender who was sixteen at the time of the offense is constitutional. At the conclu-
sion of Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, in which Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist joined, the Chief Justice stated that "because the sentencing proceedings in this
case were in no sense inconsistent with Lockett v. Ohio ... I would decide the sole issue on
which we granted certiorari andafftm thejudgment." Id. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
154 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See also Ashwander v. Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1961).
155 Seegeneral/y C. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1970); D. FORTE,
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVIsM VS. JUDICIAL RE-
STRAINT (1972); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1967); Wallace, The Jurisprudence ofjudicial Restraint: A Return to the
Moorings, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1981); Bickel, supra note 154.
156 The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving
a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter.
Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
In addition to deciding cases on other grounds, the Court has developed several other
rules by which it avoids constitutional issues: (1) the Court will not give advisory opinions;
(2) the Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation; (3) the Court will not pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who has availed himself of its benefits; (4) the Court will not
pass upon a constitutional question, unless the issue is "ripe"; (5) the Court will not decide
"political questions"; (6) the Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. See id. at 346-48; G. GUN-
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The development of this doctrine was the product of the Court's
recognition that its decision on constitutional questions is the final word
on the matter, creating binding precedent which may have long-term
and wide-ranging impact.' 57 Thus, once such a decision is made there is
often little room for growth or development in that particular area of
the law, and the will of the legislatures, as representatives of the public,
may, in many cases, be overridden. Believing that a government by the
judiciary is no substitute for a government by the people, the Court has
firmly established the doctrine ofjudicial restraint as a guiding principle
in constitutional law, and has applied the doctrine most actively when
faced with a question involving the constitutionality of a statute., 58
Given the principle of judicial restraint, it may appear that the Ed-
dings Court was justified in avoiding the certiorari issue raised by the
petitioner. Eddings' claim would certainly have affected the numerous
statutes which permit the execution of offenders who were minors at the
time of the crime.159 Moreover, the Court has often strained in its read-
ing of lower court opinions in order to avoid constitutional questions.
In Rescue Army v. Municipa/ Court,'60 for example, the Supreme Court
refused to reach the constitutional question raised because, in the view
of the majority, the state supreme court had not clearly stated which
sections of the municipal code the petitioner had violated. The
Supreme Court maintained that jurisdiction should be exerted "only
when the jurisdictional question presented by the proceeding in prohibi-
tion tenders the underlying constitutional issues in clean-cut and con-
crete form, unclouded by any serious problem of construction relating
either to the terms of the questioned legislation or its interpretation by
the state courts."' 16' Because the state court failed to state explicitly
which sections of the code were violated, the majority found that the
constitutional question presented was not in "clean-cut" and "concrete"
form. The dissent argued, however, that it was not at all unclear which
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1604-717 (10th ed. 1980); Bickel,
supra note 154, at 42-64; Mendelson, The Orthodox, or Anti-Activist, View-Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RE-
STRAINT 23-27 (1972).
157 See generallv, D. FORTE, supra note 155; L. HAND, supra note 155; Bickel, supra note 154;
Wallace, supra note 155.
158 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 500 ("la]n Act of Congress
ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains
available"). See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436 (1827);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
159 There are presently twenty-eight states with such statutes. See Brief for Appellant at 46,
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
160 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
16; Id. at 584.
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sections of the municipal code were involved because the courts below
and the parties all acted on the assumption that the appellant was
charged with having violated two particular sections of the code. 162 The
dissent thus asserted that the constitutional issue was properly shaped
and presented, according to the majority's requirements.
A more recent example of the Court's twisted reading of lower
court opinions in order to avoid constitutional questions occurred in Cio
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle.163 In that case, the city appealed, inter
alia,164 the finding of the court of appeals that its ordinance forbidding
people under seventeen to operate amusement devices violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under the cloak ofjudicial
restraint, the Court refused to decide the question and remanded the
case back to the court of appeals because the appellate court cited three
Texas court decisions, in its holding, after a long string of federal cases
upon which the decision was based. The Court found that the citation
to these three state cases might have indicated that there was an in-
dependent state ground on which the case was decided, precluding the
need to reach the federal question.
165
Justice Powell objected strenuously to the Mesquite Court's rul-
ing. 166 He pointed out that a reading of the cases indicated that they
did not provide an independent state ground and that, more impor-
tantly, "the inclusion of three cursory state-law citations in a full discus-
sion of federal law by a federal court is neither a reference to nor an
adoption of an independent state ground."'
67
162 See id. at 585 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 156, at 1613,
1670.
163 102 S. Ct. 1070 (1982).
164 The City also appealed the appellate court's holding that the statute's language "con-
nect[ed] with criminal elements" was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1072-74. After certio-
rari had been granted, the City amended the statute by eliminating the phrase. Id. at 1074.
Despite the amendment of the statute, the Court still "confront[ed] the merits of the vague-
ness holdings," ruling that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1075-76.
165 If Texas law provides independent support for the Court of Appeals'judgment, there
is no need for decision of the federal issue. On the other hand, if the City is correct in
suggesting that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of state law is dependent on its fed-
eral analysis, that court can so advise us and we can then discharge our responsibilities
free of concern that we may be unnecessarily reaching out to decide a novel constitu-
tional question.
Id. at 1077-78 (footnote omitted).
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that the Court will not review state
court decisions resting on "adequate and independent state grounds." See, e.g., Herb v. Pit-
cairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) ("The reason [for this principle] is so obvious that it has
rarely been thought to warrant statement. . . .We are not permitted to render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.").
166 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 102 S. Ct. at 1079 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
167 Id. at 1080-81 (emphasis in original).
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4. An Alternative toJudicial Subterfuge
While the strained interpretation of lower court opinions in order
to avoid constitutional questions appears to be an accepted practice of
the Supreme Court, there are strong policy arguments to be made
against such subterfuge. In the first place, it undermines the credibility
of the doctrine of judicial restraint. The Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that avoidance of constitutional questions is only justified when
the case can "fairly" be decided on other grounds.1 68 If the Court can
simply twist its reading of lower court opinions to avoid constitutional
questions, then judicial restraint will become a mechanism by which the
Court can shirk its fundamental responsibility of redressing constitu-
tional violations by employing the power of judicial review. For exam-
ple, the Eddings Court's avoidance of the certiorari issue affected inmates
who were sentenced for crimes they committed as juveniles and who
remain on death row, perhaps unconstitutionally.
Another reason why the Court's practice is pernicious is that it can
lead to unnecessary remands as in Mesquite. Such remands create extra
costs for the parties, 169 and place extra burdens on the lower courts.'
7 0
Furthermore, the Eddings remand may simply provide more ammuni-
tion to those who claim that capital defendants get too many opportuni-
ties for review at the taxpayer's expense, and seek to limit the number of
appeals available.
171
The Eddngs majority did not have to resort to stretching its inter-
pretation of the lower court opinions in order to reverse Eddings' sen-
tence and remand the case on the basis of his Lockett claim. The
majority could have, and should have, adopted the approach suggested
by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor will-
168 For example, the Court has held that it will only construe a statute so as to avoid
constitutional questions if such construction is "fairly possible." See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 5 10-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363, 365 (1974); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 192 n.6 (1974); Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
169 The increasing costs of litigation have been a matter of concern for many members of
the legal community, and many have urged attorneys and courts to take measures to reduce
litigation expenses. See Burger, Annual Report on the State ofthe Judicia!y, 62 A.B.A. J. 443, 445-
46 (1976); Leuteneker, Litigation: Saving Tne and Money, 12 HAwAII B.J., Winter 1977 at 9;
Thompson, The Expense of Litigation: Can it be Reduced, 52 L.A.B. BULL. 96 (1976).
170 In 1980 alone, the United States court of appeals heard 54,694 criminal and civil cases.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 185 (102d
ed. 1981). Most courts, state as well as federal, are overburdened, resulting in lengthy delays
and case backlog. See generally Blair, Attacking the Caseload Dilemma: An Open Letter to the Bench
andBar oflowa, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 319 (1978); Janes, Paras & Shapiro, The Appellate Settlement
Conference Program in Sacramento, 56 CAL. ST. B. J. 110 (1981).
171 See Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 101 (1982). See also
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957, 963-64 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ingly admitted that it was by no means clear that the lower courts had
refused to considered Eddings' troubled youth and emotional and
mental difficulties in mitigation. 172 She argued, however, that since
death is the gravest penalty our society can impose, a death sentence
should not be upheld, if there is any indication that an error was made
in imposing the sentence. 173 She, therefore, asserted that Eddings' sen-
tence should be reversed and the case remanded because justice requires
that the Supreme Court be certain that all mitigating circumstances had
been considered and that the death penalty had not been erroneously
imposed. 174
By adopting Justice O'Connor's approach, the Court could still
have protected capital defendants, and it would not have undermined
judicial restraint, since a fair reading of the lower court opinions would
have been given. Nor would the Court have created an unnecessary
remand, because the remand would have been in the interests of justice,
and not the result of a strained reading. Moreover, the remand would
have encouraged the lower courts to be more clear in their future deci-
sions in order to avoid similar remands.
Justice O'Connor also offered the Court an opportunity to enter-
tain Eddings' Locke/I claim without violating its own procedural rules.
She argued that the Court could consider Eddings' Locket claim by in-
voking the plain error doctrine. 175 According to this doctrine, the Court
may review an issue not raised below or in the petition for certiorari if
the Court finds that some basic unfairness might otherwise go uncor-
rected. 176 Based on this doctrine, the majority could have found, as Jus-
tice O'Connor did, that there was enough of a possibility that an error
172 "[O]ne can reasonably argue that these extemporaneous remarks [made by the trial
judge] are of no legal significance . . . ." 102 S. Ct. at 878 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"[T]he Court has sought to emphasize the variety of mitigating information that may not have
been considered [in this case]." Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 878.
174 [W]e may not speculate as to whether the trial judge and the Court of Criminal
Appeals actually considered all of the mitigating factors and found them insufficient to
offset the aggravating circumstances, or whether the difference between this Court's
opinion and the trial court's treatment of the petitioner's evidence is 'purely a matter of
semantics,' as suggested by the dissent. Woodson and Lockett require us to remove any
legitimate basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually considered by the
trial court.
Id.
175 Id. at 878 n.*.
176 See Sup. CT. R. 40(l)(d) (2) (questions not presented in the petition for certiorari will be
disregarded by the court, "save as the court, at its option, may notice as a plain error not
presented"). See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 265 n.5. ("Even if one considers that the
conflict-of-interest question was not technically raised below, there is ample support for a
remand required in the interests of justice.'); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936) (Court may recognize plain errors where the errors "affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of public proceedings.').
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had been committed by the courts below to justify reviewing Eddings'
Lockelt claim. Such reasoning would have been more sound and forth-
right than that which was offered by the majority.'
77
Thus, the problem with the majority decision was not the outcome,
but the process by which it was reached. Had the Court taken a
straightforward approach, acknowledging the ambiguities in the deci-
sions below and relying on the plain error rule, the result would have
been an opinion which represented a commitment to fairness in capital
sentencing. Instead, the majority's opinion suggests that the Court vio-
lated its own procedural rules and deliberately twisted its interpretation
of the lower court decisions in order to avoid an important constitu-
tional question. In Eddings, there was no need for such procedural im-
propriety, nor for such distortion of the doctrine of judicial restraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
Eddings v. Oklahoma is unlikely to be remembered for what the
Court decided. While the decision is an affirmation of the Court's posi-
tion that death penalty sentencing must focus on the uniqueness of the
individual defendant, it breaks no new ground. Rather, Eddings is far
more likely to be remembered for the Court's failure to resolve the in-
creasingly contested issue of whether it is constitutional to impose the
death penalty on minors. Yet, the Court may have only temporarily
avoided the issue; in August of 1982 Monty Lee Eddings was resen-
tenced to death. 17 He intends to appeal.
179
HELENE B. GREENWALD
177 Ste supra notes 129, 132-36 and accompanying text.
178 Telephone interview with Jay C. Baker, Monty Lee Eddings' attorney (Sept. 28, 1982).
179 Telephone interview with Jay C. Baker, Monty Lee Eddings' attorney (Sept. 28, 1982).
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